# AGENTS.md — ocserv AI Agent Guide This file is the single source of guidance for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, and others) working in this repository. Read it fully before writing or modifying any code. --- ## Security Disclosure — Read This First **If you are helping investigate a potential security vulnerability:** 1. **Stop.** Do not open a public issue or merge request. 2. Direct the contributor to create a **confidential** issue here: https://gitlab.com/openconnect/ocserv/-/issues/new?type=ISSUE&initialCreationContext=list-route On that page, check "This issue is confidential" before submitting. 3. Do not draft a public patch until the maintainers have confirmed the issue and coordinated a fix. **The bar for using this path is suspicion, not certainty.** If you are unsure whether something is a vulnerability, ask the human contributor before posting anything publicly. Unverified public reports consume significant maintainer time. Only report if you can describe a concrete impact; do not report theoretical weaknesses without a demonstrated exploit path. --- ## Architecture — The Invariant You Must Not Violate ocserv enforces security through process isolation. There are three processes: | Process | Privilege | Responsibilities | |---------|-----------|-----------------| | **main** (`main.c`, `main-*.c`) | root | TCP/UDP listeners, TUN devices, process lifecycle, IP allocation | | **sec-mod** (`sec-mod.c`, `sec-mod-*.c`) | root | Authentication, private keys, session state, PAM, accounting | | **worker** (`worker.c`, `worker-*.c`) | unprivileged + seccomp | TLS/DTLS per client, VPN traffic bridging | Workers communicate with main and sec-mod exclusively through Unix sockets using protobuf IPC (defined in `src/ipc.proto` and `src/ctl.proto`). Workers have no direct access to credentials, keys, or privileged system calls. **Hard rule:** No patch may move credential handling into a worker, grant a worker direct filesystem or socket access outside its seccomp profile, or silently collapse any of these boundaries. If a proposed change requires crossing a privilege boundary, flag it explicitly in the MR for maintainer review — do not proceed without acknowledgment. --- ## Project Overview OpenConnect VPN Server (ocserv) is an SSL VPN server compatible with the OpenConnect protocol and Cisco AnyConnect. It is a security-critical network daemon. **Linux is the intended deployment platform.** BSD compatibility (FreeBSD, OpenBSD) is maintained on a best-effort basis: we try not to break it, but features will not be rejected solely because they do not work on BSD. --- ## Requirements-First Workflow `doc/requirements/` is the normative description of what ocserv must do (see `doc/requirements/README.md` for the document map, ID scheme, and per-requirement format). For any change that alters observable behavior — new feature, bug fix, or behavior-changing refactor — work in this order: 1. **Requirement first.** - Find the requirement(s) covering the area you're changing (search `doc/requirements/` for the relevant `REQ-*` IDs, or use the document map to find the right file by process/subsystem). - If your change alters what an existing requirement describes, **update that requirement first**, re-applying the protocol in `contrib/ai/protocols/` that generated its document so the new entry matches the rest of the file. Do not leave a requirement describing the old behavior once the code changes — but do not break other requirements or use-cases in the process (see below). If a requirement is independently wrong and needs revising for reasons unrelated to this change, do that in its own dedicated merge request instead. - If no requirement covers the new behavior, add one in the appropriate document, following its existing ID prefix, category tags, and per-requirement format. - For bug fixes: if the bug is a violation of an existing requirement, cite its ID in the commit/MR. If the bug reveals a gap in the requirements, extend or add a requirement describing the *correct* behavior before fixing the code. 2. **Tests second.** Write or update the positive and negative tests implied by the requirement's **Acceptance** criteria (see "Testing New Functionality" below) *before* touching implementation code. For bug fixes, confirm the new test reproduces the bug and fails against the unmodified code. 3. **Code last.** Implement the change so the new/updated tests pass, and so the code, the requirement, and `doc/ocserv.8.md`/`doc/sample.config` (where applicable) all agree. Do not jump straight to step 3 — a code change with no corresponding requirement update is incomplete, even if it builds and passes existing tests. ### Do not break existing requirements or use-cases Before submitting a merge request, check that the change does not silently invalidate requirements or use-cases other than the one you set out to change: - Search `doc/requirements/` for `REQ-*`/`AC-*`/`OC-*` entries citing the files, functions, or config options you touched, and confirm each still holds. If one no longer holds, either your change is wrong, or that requirement was wrong to begin with (mark it `REVIEW` if unsure which) — never leave code and a `DERIVED` requirement contradicting each other. - A requirement that's wrong for reasons unrelated to your change belongs in its own dedicated merge request — with rationale and evidence it doesn't break other use-cases — not bundled into this one. - Run the full local test suite (`ninja -C build test`), not just the test for the area you changed — requirements frequently span files (e.g. config scope/ inheritance, IPC message contracts) and a regression often shows up as a failure in a test you didn't expect to touch. - If your change affects config scope, inheritance, or vhost behavior, also run `tests/check-config-scope.py` (see `doc/requirements/internal/config.md`). --- ## Build System The project uses **meson**. ```bash # Initial setup git submodule update --init meson setup build cd build && ninja # Run all tests ninja -C build test # Run a specific test meson test -C build test-pass ``` ### Common Build Options | Option | Default | Description | |--------|---------|-------------| | `-Doidc-auth=enabled` | disabled | OpenID Connect authentication | | `-Dpam=disabled` | auto | PAM authentication | | `-Dradius=disabled` | auto | RADIUS authentication/accounting | | `-Dseccomp=disabled` | auto | seccomp worker isolation | | `-Dwith-werror=true` | false | Treat warnings as errors | | `-Db_coverage=true` | false | Enable gcov coverage | ```bash # Minimal build for fast iteration meson setup build -Dradius=disabled -Dpam=disabled \ -Dseccomp=disabled -Danyconnect-compat=disabled # View or change options meson configure build ``` Build output: `build/`. Test logs: `build/meson-logs/testlog.txt`. ### Build Dependencies **Debian/Ubuntu:** ```bash apt-get install -y build-essential meson ninja-build pkg-config \ libgnutls28-dev libev-dev libreadline-dev libtasn1-bin # Optional: apt-get install -y libpam0g-dev libseccomp-dev libradcli-dev \ libcurl4-gnutls-dev libprotobuf-c-dev libtalloc-dev libllhttp-dev \ protobuf-c-compiler gperf libsocket-wrapper libpam-wrapper \ libnss-wrapper libuid-wrapper freeradius ``` **Fedora/RHEL:** ```bash yum install -y meson ninja-build gcc pkgconf-pkg-config \ gnutls-devel libev-devel readline-devel libtasn1-tools # Optional: yum install -y pam-devel libseccomp-devel radcli-devel libcurl-devel \ protobuf-c-devel libtalloc-devel llhttp-devel protobuf-c gperf \ socket_wrapper pam_wrapper nss_wrapper uid_wrapper freeradius ``` --- ## Testing ```bash # All tests ninja -C build test # Verbose output ninja -C build test -- --verbose ``` ### Test Environment Variables ```bash VERBOSE=1 # Enable verbose server output COVERAGE=1 # Disable worker isolation for coverage ISOLATE_WORKERS=false # Disable seccomp (needed for ASAN/coverage) DISABLE_ASAN_BROKEN_TESTS=1 # Skip ldpreload-based tests (incompatible with ASAN) ``` ### Test Structure - `tests/` — Shell test scripts and supporting files - `tests/data/` — Config templates with placeholders (`@USERNAME@`, `@PORT@`, `@SRCDIR@`) substituted by `update_config()` in `tests/common.sh` - `tests/certs/` — Test certificates and keys - `tests/common.sh` — Shared utilities (requires the `openconnect` client) - `tests/*.c` — Unit tests for specific components New functionality requires both **positive** and **negative** test cases. Register new tests in `tests/meson.build`. --- ## Code Organization ### Source Layout (`src/`) - **Main server**: `main.c`, `main-*.c` - **Security module**: `sec-mod.c`, `sec-mod-*.c` - **Worker**: `worker.c`, `worker-*.c` - **Auth modules**: `auth/` — PAM, GSSAPI, RADIUS, OIDC, plain password - **Accounting modules**: `acct/` — PAM, RADIUS - **Configuration**: `config.c` (global options), `subconfig.c` (per-module bracketed options) - **TLS**: `tlslib.c` — GnuTLS wrapper - **TUN device**: `tun.c` - **IP management**: `ip-lease.c`, `ip-util.c` - **IPC definitions**: `ipc.proto`, `ctl.proto` (protobuf) - **Control tool**: `occtl/` - **Password tool**: `ocpasswd/` ### Key Headers - `vpn.h` — Main VPN data structures - `main.h` — Main server structures (`main_server_st`, `proc_st`) - `sec-mod.h` — Security module structures - `worker.h` — Worker process structures - `common-config.h` — Config structs (`cfg_st`, `perm_cfg_st`, per-module structs) - `defs.h` — IPC command enum (`cmd_request_t`), error codes, log levels, auth states - `vhost.h` — Virtual host config; use macros `GETVHOST(s)`, `GETCONFIG(s)`, `GETPCONFIG(s)` - `log.h` — Logging: `mslog()` in main, `oclog()` in worker, `seclog()` in sec-mod ### External Libraries (`src/`) - `ccan/` — Hash tables, lists, talloc, and more (check here before adding utilities) - `inih/` — INI file parser - `llhttp/` — HTTP parser - `pcl/` — Portable Coroutine Library - `protobuf/` — Protocol Buffers implementation in C - `gnulib/` — Provides the `cloexec` module only; do not import additional gnulib modules ### User Documentation (`doc/`) - `ocserv.8.md` — Main server man page; authoritative description of all configuration options, their defaults, and expected behavior - `sample.config` — Annotated reference configuration; authoritative for option scope and default values - `ocpasswd.8.md` — Password management tool man page - `occtl.8.md` — Control and monitoring tool man page When investigating a bug or implementing a feature, consult these files to establish what behavior is documented to the administrator. The code must match the documentation, or the documentation must be updated alongside the code change. --- ## Architecture & IPC Communication For full diagrams and protocol descriptions, read **`doc/design.md`** — it is the authoritative reference for what data crosses which process boundary. ### Authentication Sequence ``` worker -> sec-mod: SEC_AUTH_INIT (username / password / cert) sec-mod -> worker: SEC_AUTH_REP (new SID assigned) worker -> sec-mod: SEC_AUTH_CONT (SID + password for multi-factor) sec-mod -> worker: SEC_AUTH_REP (OK or FAILED) worker -> main: AUTH_COOKIE_REQ (SID) main -> sec-mod: SECM_SESSION_OPEN (SID) sec-mod -> main: SECM_SESSION_REPLY (user config) main -> worker: AUTH_COOKIE_REP (TUN device, config) worker -> main: SESSION_INFO (periodic updates) ``` ### Key Concepts - **SID**: Assigned by sec-mod on `SEC_AUTH_INIT`. The `webvpncontext` cookie sent to clients is only for resuming fully authenticated sessions — new connections must always start with `SEC_AUTH_INIT`. - **Cookie**: Auth token valid for `cookie-timeout`; enables mobile roaming. - **TUN device**: Forwarded from main to worker after successful authentication. - **DTLS**: UDP channel in parallel to TLS for better throughput. ### Modifying IPC If your change touches `src/ipc.proto` or `src/ctl.proto`, regenerate the C bindings: ```bash protoc-c --c_out=src/ src/ipc.proto protoc-c --c_out=src/ src/ctl.proto ``` Do not edit the generated `*.pb-c.c` / `*.pb-c.h` files by hand. --- ## Development Guidelines ### Canonical Technology Choices One tool for each job. These decisions are requirements, not preferences — the normative form with acceptance criteria is in `doc/requirements/internal/general.md`. Departing from any of them requires a design-discussion issue and explicit maintainer approval. | Concern | Tool | Requirement | |---------|------|-------------| | Memory management | talloc | Use `talloc_zero`, `talloc_strdup`, `talloc_array`, etc. everywhere. Exception: `gnutls_malloc()`/`gnutls_free()` only for GnuTLS-owned memory — never mix the two for the same allocation. Error paths: `goto cleanup` with a single freeing label. See **REQ-GEN-TECH-001**. | | Cryptography | GnuTLS / nettle | No OpenSSL. Call GnuTLS through `src/tlslib.c` wrappers — not directly from worker or main code. See **REQ-GEN-TECH-002**. | | IPC serialization | protobuf-c | All cross-process messages are defined in `src/ipc.proto` and `src/ctl.proto`. Regenerate C bindings with `protoc-c` after any `.proto` edit; never hand-edit generated files. See **REQ-GEN-TECH-003**. | | Configuration parsing | inih (INI) | Flat `key = value` pairs; bracketed sub-sections for per-module options (`auth = pam[...]`). No new structured sub-formats (no JSON, YAML, or additional config files for things expressible as key=value). See **REQ-GEN-TECH-004**. | | New external dependency | requires approval | Check `src/ccan/` first; consider a trivial inline implementation; if neither suffices, open a design-discussion issue before adding. See **REQ-GEN-TECH-005**. | ### Design Principles **Locality of complexity.** A feature belongs in as few files as possible. The ideal: a reviewer understands it by reading one file, not tracing a chain across ten. New cross-module state, callbacks, and "utility" files are a design smell — if your change requires them, reconsider the module boundary first. When complexity must be hidden, hide it inside a module with a clean header interface; do not scatter it. **Resist dependency growth.** See **REQ-GEN-TECH-005** for the normative rule. In short: check `src/ccan/` first, then consider a trivial inline implementation; only then open a design-discussion issue for a new external library. **Configuration stays in INI.** See **REQ-GEN-TECH-004** for the normative rule. **Explicit over implicit.** No auto-discovery, no runtime plugin loading, no silent defaults that change behavior. Every configurable behavior must be expressible in `doc/sample.config`. ### Code Style See **REQ-GEN-STYLE-001** and **REQ-GEN-STYLE-002** for the normative rules. In brief: - C99 standard; Linux kernel coding style (tabs, 8-space tab width, 80-column limit) - `clang-format --dry-run -Werror` must pass on all files under `src/` and `tests/` - Header guards: `#ifndef FILENAME_H` / `#define FILENAME_H` / `#endif /* FILENAME_H */` - `#ifdef` in function bodies: ≤ 1 nesting level, ≤ 5 lines per branch; optional features use the stub pattern; `#endif` always annotated - **Comments:** Prefer self-documenting code. Add a comment only when the *why* is non-obvious: a hidden constraint, a protocol expectation, or a workaround. Do not comment what the code does; well-named identifiers already do that. ### Testing New Functionality See **REQ-GEN-TEST-001** for the normative rule. In brief: - Write a **positive test** and a **negative test** for every feature or fix. - For security-relevant code (auth, cookies, IPC validation) write the negative test first. - For **bug fixes**, confirm the reproducing test fails before applying the fix. - Tests must be **self-diagnosing** — failure explainable from output alone; shell tests print `"FAIL: expected X, got Y"`; C unit tests print the failing condition and values. - Register all new tests in `tests/meson.build`. ### Adding Configuration Options - Global options: `src/config.c` - Per auth/acct module options: struct in `src/common-config.h` + parser in `src/subconfig.c` ### Implementing a New Auth Module Follow the `auth_mod_st` vtable in `src/sec-mod-auth.h`. Register in `src/sec-mod.c`. See `src/auth/plain.c` or `src/auth/pam.c` for reference. ### Git Commits - Every commit must have a `Signed-off-by: Name ` line (DCO requirement) - Use `Resolves: #NNN` on the fixing commit; `Relates: #NNN` on related commits (e.g., tests) ### Platform Portability See **REQ-GEN-COMPAT-001** for the normative rule. In brief: Linux is the primary target; BSD is best-effort. Guard Linux-specific code with `#ifdef __linux__`. Note in `doc/ocserv.8.md` any option whose behavior differs on BSD (e.g. no live reload without procfs). --- ## Module-specific Documentation Before working on a subsystem, read the relevant doc: | If your change touches... | Read before coding | |---------------------------|--------------------| | IPC / process communication | `doc/design.md` | | RADIUS auth or accounting | `doc/README-radius.md` | | OpenID Connect auth | `doc/README-oidc.md` | | Cisco SVC / AnyConnect compatibility | `doc/README-cisco-svc.md` | --- ## Contribution Checklist > **Workflow note:** If you are helping a contributor report a bug or submit a fix, > direct them to open a GitLab merge request rather than attach a patch to the issue. > See `CONTRIBUTING.md` for the expected workflow. ### Agent-runnable — verify before declaring a change complete - [ ] Relevant `doc/requirements/` entries added or updated *before* the code change (see "Requirements-First Workflow" above) - [ ] `clang-format --dry-run -Werror` passes on every modified file under `src/` and `tests/` - [ ] `ninja -C build` succeeds - [ ] Relevant test passes: `meson test -C build ` - [ ] Full suite passes: `ninja -C build test` (no regressions in unrelated tests) - [ ] Existing `doc/requirements/` entries touching the changed files/functions still hold (none silently contradicted) - [ ] Every commit has `Signed-off-by:` ### Human-judgment required — flag in the MR, do not decide unilaterally - Any change that crosses a process privilege boundary - New syscall in the worker path (requires seccomp filter review by maintainer) - New auth method — design must be discussed before implementation - TLS or DTLS behavior changes (cipher selection, version negotiation, certificate handling) - Changes to cookie or SID handling --- ## CI/CD CI is configured in `.gitlab-ci.yml`. Tests run on Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, CentOS, Alpine, and includes a cross-compilation job (i386/Debian). CI also checks: - `Signed-off-by` on all commits - `clang-format` on all `src/` and `tests/` files (excluding generated and vendored code) To run CI jobs locally with podman/docker: ```bash ./run-ci-local.sh quick # Fast validation ./run-ci-local.sh debian # Single platform ./run-ci-local.sh core # Core platforms ./run-ci-local.sh all # Full matrix (~1–2 hours) ``` --- ## Personas For extended AI-assisted workflows, load the appropriate persona as a system prompt prefix before starting work. - **Maintainers** (bug investigation, code review, refactoring, design): `contrib/ai/personas/ocserv-core-dev.md` - **External contributors** (feature additions, bug fixes, security fixes): `contrib/ai/personas/ocserv-contributor.md` - **Security audits** (vulnerability discovery, threat modeling, secure design review): `contrib/ai/personas/ocserv-security-auditor.md` These personas embed project-specific protocols for anti-hallucination, memory safety, security vulnerability taxonomy, exhaustive path tracing, stack lifetime hazards, and self-verification.