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ocserv/TODO
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos 949fbacf32 doc update
2014-03-01 17:38:22 +01:00

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Short term items:
* Add support for libubus
* Think for ways for ocserv to co-exist on the same system with
an HTTPS server (while sharing the same port).
* More elaborate checks on "make check". Currently we test whether a
cookie can be obtained, but not whether a TUN devices is created or
data can be transfered. Need more ideas on how that can be done.
* When a user (IP) gets into the BAN list multiple times, disable it for
longer time (or should we drop this functionality altogether and rely
on PAM handling that?)
* Change into hashtables the lists that are used during a client
connection.
* Give each worker a limited number of accesses to the security module.
* Switch to a fork-then-exec mode to reduce memory usage on workers.
* Use talloc in main process to simplify the release of resources.
Long term items:
* Think how the DTLS part can use better negotiation of algorithms and DTLS
is negotiated properly. Using PSK ciphersuites seem to be like a solution,
but that would require a new protocol to be implemented in openconnect
client and ocserv.
* Certificate authentication to the main process. Possibly that is just
wishful thinking. To verify the TLS client certificate verify signature
packet one needs instead of the signature, the contents of all the handshake
messages, and knowledge of the negotiated TLS version, in addition to being
able to select the server hello random. That could be done sanely only if
gnutls provided facilities to set the server hello random, and override the
client signature verification at an early stage before data are hashed
(to verify that the set random value was present in the handshake).