ocserv/TODO

Short term items:

* Move PAM (and other authentication methods) to sec-mod, to prevent
  any leakage to the worker process. Alternatively that could be
  prevented in a fork-then-exec mode switch, but unfortunately that
  requires the reload of all certificates/parameters on the worker
  process, and imposes a quite high penalty (see the 'exec' branch).

* Think for ways for ocserv to co-exist on the same system with
  an HTTPS server (while sharing the same port).

* More elaborate checks on "make check". Currently we test whether a
  cookie can be obtained, but not whether a TUN devices is created or
  data can be transfered. Need more ideas on how that can be done.

* When a user (IP) gets into the BAN list multiple times, disable it for
  longer time (or should we drop this functionality altogether and rely
  on PAM handling that?)

* Change into hashtables the lists that are used during a client
  connection.

* Give each worker a limited number of accesses to the security module.

Long term items:

* Think how the DTLS part can use better negotiation of algorithms and DTLS
  is negotiated properly. Using PSK ciphersuites seem to be like a solution, 
  but that would require a new protocol to be implemented in openconnect
  client and ocserv. 

* Certificate authentication to the main process. Possibly that is just
  wishful thinking. To verify the TLS client certificate verify signature 
  one needs in addition to the signature, the contents of all the handshake 
  messages, and knowledge of the negotiated TLS version, as well as being 
  able to select the server hello random. That could be done sanely only if 
  gnutls provided facilities to set the server hello random, and override the 
  client signature verification at an early stage before data are hashed 
  (to verify that the set random value was present in the handshake).
  However, the complexity required to implement that may in fact reduce
  security rather than increase it.