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Merge branch 'tmp-remove-todo' into 'master'
Removed TODO file; it is out-of-date See merge request openconnect/ocserv!220
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42
TODO
42
TODO
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Short term items:
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* Modify the test suite to be able to run without root privileges. That
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could be done by using virt-builder for the tests instead of docker.
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* When a user (IP) gets into the BAN list multiple times, disable it for
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longer time (or should we drop this functionality altogether and rely
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on PAM handling that?)
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* Add support for memcached, to allow sharing server state.
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* Give each worker a limited number of accesses to the security module.
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* Allow overriding client hostnames via group or user configuration.
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* We only send the right profile hash to client, only the a single profile
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is specified in the global configuration file. When sending profile.xml
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(user-profile) with the per-user configuration file, we do not send the
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right profile hash to client, we do send the global configuration file only.
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Long term items:
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* radius: Consider supporting rfc5176.
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* Think how the DTLS part can use better negotiation of algorithms and DTLS
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is negotiated properly. Using PSK ciphersuites seem to be like a solution,
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but that would require a new protocol to be implemented in openconnect
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client and ocserv.
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* Certificate authentication to the security module. Possibly that is just
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wishful thinking. To verify the TLS client certificate verify signature
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one needs in addition to the signature, the contents of all the handshake
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messages, and knowledge of the negotiated TLS version, as well as being
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able to select the server hello random. That could be done sanely only if
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gnutls provided facilities to set the server hello random, and override the
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client signature verification at an early stage before data are hashed
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(to verify that the set random value was present in the handshake).
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However, the complexity required to implement that may in fact reduce
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security rather than increase it.
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* Allow for a non-root mode where all networking is handled using something
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like slirp (e.g., https://github.com/SPICE/slirp)
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