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ocserv/TODO
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos 5a4ce846b7 The TLS private keys are kept into a privileged process.
That process is called security-module (sec-mod) and communicates
with the workers using a unix domain socket.
2013-03-15 17:47:38 +01:00

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* Fix SIGHUP handling on the main server.
* Think how the DTLS part can use better negotiation of algorithms and DTLS
versions than the current openssl string approach (using PSK ciphersuites
seem to be like a solution, but then we could not use the session ID to
forward the UDP connection to the proper worker).
* Try adding salsa20-12 and UMAC as encryption algorithms for DTLS to reduce
CPU load in systems without AES accelerator.
* Handle users being in multiple groups.
* Certificate authentication to the main process. Possibly that is just
wishful thinking. To verify the TLS client certificate verify signature one
needs instead of the signature, the contents of all the handshake messages,
and knowledge of the negotiated TLS version, in addition to being able to
select the server hello random. That could be done sanely only if gnutls
provided facilities to set the server hello random, and override the client
signature verification at an early stage before data are hashed (to verify
that the set random value was present in the handshake).
* When a TUN device is in use and cannot be assigned mark it as such and
continue.
* When a user (IP) gets into the BAN list multiple times, disable it for
long.